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INTRODUCTION

Keeping abreast of new technologies and in particular new uses of social
media is a necessity for an intellectual property (“IP”) law practitioner in 2014–
2015. Social media has in many ways made things more complicated for IP
lawyers. It provides various and bountiful new ways to infringe a trademark or
distribute counterfeit goods and allows simple and widespread distribution of
copyrighted information. Additionally, protective cease and desist letters must
be drafted with the knowledge that they may be posted and “go viral” on social
media, potentially exposing a client to a damaging public relations backlash.
In addition to the special attention IP lawyers must give to social media
when counseling clients, it would be logical to assume that IP lawyers would be
the experts of the legal industry on proper professional use of social media for
another reason. After all, two of our primary client constituencies are science and
technology companies. If not IP lawyers, which other type of lawyer would be
better suited to model how to use social media correctly for professional success?
Our colleagues may be counting on us to be the vanguard of the profession.
Yet this is a hard expectation to meet. Even as IP lawyers fully embrace
personal and professional social media use, how and when such use may
implicate the professional rules of conduct is complicated and fraught with
inconsistencies.
Some help is on the way. The ABA updated its Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MR” or the “Rules”) in August 2012 with amendments
proposed by a specially‐convened “ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20” to take
into account all manner of electronic communication, including social media.1
These new amendments to the Rules are now being considered for adoption in
many states.2 Likewise, the bar associations of several states and cities have
1

See ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, Revised Resolution 105A (Aug. 6, 2012) (as
amended),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
ethics_2020/20120808_revised_resolution_105a_as_amended.authcheckdam.
pdf; see also ABA Comm’n on Ethics 20/20, August 2012 Proposals,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/2
0120415_one_page_summary_of_august_proposals.authcheckdam.pdf (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015).

2

As of January 24, 2015, the amendments have been adopted at least in part in
AR, CT, DE, ID, IA, KS, NV, NM, NC, OR, PA, WV, and WY. For a chart
showing state by state progress of adoption of the 20/20 amendments, see
ABA Ctr. for Profʹl Responsibility Policy Implementation Comm., State by
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attempted to help practitioners navigate the ethical waters as to social media use
with guideline documents and advisory opinions issued by their committees on
professional ethics.3 But the Rules do not provide much guidance for certain
common situations, the opinions from the different bar associations often
contradict each other,4 and not all issues are resolved by the judiciary or
explained in guidelines.5 As a result, conduct that may be perfectly ethical and
appropriate in one jurisdiction can spark an allegation of misconduct in another.
Is the solution to avoid social media in a professional context altogether?
Not only would that be economically foolish, but also avoiding technology might
in and of itself be unethical. According to a new comment to MR 1.1, to
“maintain the requisite knowledge and skill, a lawyer should keep abreast of . . .
the benefits and risks associated with relevant technology . . . .”6 Practitioners
must embrace change and confront the ethical questions directly, even as the
debates continue within legal regulatory bodies.
What follows is an analysis of the most relevant developments in this
area, where common uses of social media implicate ethics rules. Although the
issues are relevant to all attorneys, they may particularly impact IP practitioners
because of their interest in and necessary focus on social media. This article
discusses four salient topics, chosen because they are either unsettled, highly
common, implicate rules that are easy to violate, or all three. Part II considers
when posting (actively or passively) implicates advertising and solicitation rules.
Part III discusses maintaining client confidentiality while posting. Part IV gives
guidance on how to use social media to gather information during discovery.
Finally, Part V discusses using social media in court.
State Adoption of Selected Ethics 20/20 Commission Policies and Guidelines for an
International Regulatory Information Exchange (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter State
by
State
Adoption],
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/professional_responsibility/state_implementation_selected_e
20_20_rules.authcheckdam.pdf.
3

See, e.g., Guidelines for Networking Sites, FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON ADVER.
(Apr. 16, 2013); Conn. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Informal Opinion
2012‐03 (Apr. 25, 2012); N.Y. City Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal
Op. 2012‐2 (2012)).

4

See infra Parts II–V.

5

See, e.g., infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that states have not addressed whether a
customer success story posted on a forum like Avvo constitutes a
“testimonial” and, if so, how an attorney should respond).

6

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 8 (2013).
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For purposes of the discussion, this article focuses on LinkedIn, Twitter,
Facebook, and, to a lesser extent, Avvo and blogs, since these are the social media
formats that most IP practitioners have already experienced. The issues
presented in this article, however, apply to all platforms. This article refers to the
Rules themselves as well as the state‐adopted versions, advisory non‐binding
opinions from city and state bar associations, guideline documents circulated by
state bar association committees, and state supreme court cases. This article
highlights ethical issues and points out inconsistencies of interpretation not in an
effort to make the use of social media intimidating, but rather to offer a
framework from which a practitioner may act with more confidence and better
gauge the appropriate time to seek a second opinion. One thing is clear:
practitioners must consider these issues, research the ethics opinions of state and
local bar associations and rulings of state courts, and take control of their online
presence whether or not it has been a significant part of their legal practice thus
far.
II.

WHEN POSTING INFORMATION BECOMES AN ADVERTISEMENT

IP practitioners use social media for a variety of professional purposes. It
is an efficient way to communicate with clients, announce successes, contribute
to the legal community in the form of blogs and newsletters, and reach
prospective new clients. There are limits, however, to what a practitioner may
post within the bounds of the ethics rules. Some of the easiest rules to violate are
the rules regulating advertising. These issues apply both when a lawyer posts
about herself and when others post about her.
A.

When Posting About Oneself May Violate Ethics Rules on
Advertising

Most states have adopted some version of MRs 7.1–7.4, which control
what an attorney can say, to whom, under what conditions, and using what
format when the communication concerns the attorney’s services, particularly
when the communication is designed to attract clients.7 Generally there are three
levels of requirements under the rules, as follows: (1) the least restrictive rules
concern all attorney communication about services;8 (2) more restrictive rules

7

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1–7.4 (2013).

8

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (2013) (Communication Concerning
A Lawyer’s Services).
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concern attorney advertising;9 and (3) the most restrictive rules concern when
that advertising constitutes solicitation.10
1.

Posting a Social Media Profile

Posting a profile on social media when it is used to “promote the lawyer
or law firm’s practice” is advertising.11 Even posting a profile consisting of only
bare contact information and qualifications can implicate the Rules.12 There are at
least two issues to keep in mind when creating a profile for social media sites like
Facebook or LinkedIn: (1) information cannot be false or misleading (i.e., it
cannot contain “a material misrepresentation of fact or law”);13 and (2) the
attorney must not claim she is an expert or has a specialty without appropriate
justification and possibly disclaimers.14
There are a surprising number of risks in accomplishing this simple task.
To take an IP‐specific example, under MR 7.4, an attorney may not necessarily
state on her profile that she “specializes in patent law,” even if patent law makes
up more than fifty percent of her practice. This statement could imply that she is
certified to practice before the USPTO. If she is not in fact a member of the Patent
Bar, this statement would run afoul of MR 7.4. In fact, this exact example is one
of the exceptions under MR 7.4: an attorney may not post information that states
or implies that she is certified in a specialty unless she (a) has been admitted to
the Patent Bar; (b) engages in Admiralty practice; or (c) is (i) “certified as a
specialist by an organization that has been approved by an appropriate state
authority or that has been accredited by the American Bar Association; and [if]

9

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2013) (Advertising).

10

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013) (Solicitation of Clients).

11

See Guidelines for Networking Sites, supra note 3.

12

See, e.g., Quick Facts About Legal Ethics and Social Networking, VIRGINIA STATE
BAR, http://www.vsb.org/site/regulation/facts‐ethics‐social‐networking (last
visited Jan. 25, 2015) (“Statements made on social networks about a lawyer’s
services may be subject to the advertising rules.”).

13

Id.

14

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2013). For an example of a
required disclaimer, see N.Y. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4(c)(2)
(2013).
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(ii) the name of the certifying organization is clearly identified in the
communication.”15
Some states have enacted even stricter versions of MR 7.4. For example,
New York not only limits when a practitioner may call herself a specialist or state
that she specializes in a particular field, but also requires a prominently posted
disclaimer to accompany the label.16 Although the disclaimer was successfully
challenged in the Second Circuit,17 the court did uphold the constitutionality of
one portion of the disclaimer—albeit under some uncertainty—by declaring that
portion was void for vagueness as applied to the particular facts of the case.18
Because the Grievance Committee (the professional conduct overseeing body
appointed by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court) does
not offer advisory opinions, lawyers practicing in New York have little guidance
about how to comply with these requirements.19
Is it as simple as listing skills and practice areas without calling them
“specialties?” Can a lawyer instead call herself an “expert,” or is that also
problematic? Does she merely have to avoid the use of these specific terms? The
social media platforms’ formats complicate matters. It is difficult, for example, to
fit a long disclaimer on a Twitter profile. In addition, what can a lawyer do when
a platform, like LinkedIn for example, allows outside parties to endorse her or
automatically labels sections with hot‐button terms like “Specialties” or “Skills
and Expertise?”
Although a specific discussion of the Endorsement feature is in Part II, it
is worth mentioning here that several state bar associations—as well as
individual lawyers—realized that the LinkedIn labeling could present an
important ethical obstacle and alerted LinkedIn.20 Lawyers are an important

15

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4 (2013).

16

N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.4(c)(2) (2013).

17

Hayes v. N.Y. Attorney Grievance Comm. of the Eighth Judicial Dist., 672
F.3d 158, 170 (2d Cir. 2012).

18

Id.

19

Id. (“[The former principal counsel to the Grievance Committee] added that
the Committee did not provide advisory opinions because, in part, ‘it would
probably take up most of our work.’”).

20

Interview with Catalin Cosovanu, Senior Prod. Counsel, LinkedIn (Mar. 11,
2014) [hereinafter Interview with Catalin Cosovanu]; see James Dedman, The
South Carolina Bar and the LinkedIn “Loophole,” ABNORMAL USE (Mar. 4, 2013),
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constituency of LinkedIn, making up 770,000 of their 100 million registered
members.21 LinkedIn had already been considering ways to address the issue,
and instituted two fixes: (1) as of January 2014 it changed the “Skills and
Expertise” section in the individual profile to read “Skills and Endorsements;”
and (2) as of late 2013 a “Specialties” default setting no longer appeared when a
user created her profile section at the top of the homepage.22 LinkedIn considers
this issue resolved.23
LinkedIn’s actions likely had a mollifying effect. The Florida Bar
Committee on Advertising voted on March 11, 2014 not to pursue a planned
Advisory Opinion.24 This is especially significant because the Florida Bar is
extremely active in the lawyer advertising and social media space, as evidenced
by its decision to (1) incorporate social media concepts into its rules on lawyer
advertising (effective May 1, 2013),25 and (2) issue both Guidelines for
Networking Sites26 and a Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation.27

http://abnormaluse.com/2013/03/the‐south‐carolina‐bar‐and‐the‐linkedin‐
loophole.html; Update: Complying with Bar rules on LinkedIn may be easier than
thought, FLA. BAR NEWS (Jan. 1, 2014), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/
JN/jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/0e9ba4af36b1dbb78525
7c4a004c633e!OpenDocument; Julie Kay, New Florida Bar Advertising Rules
Vex Lawyers, DAILY BUS. REV. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.dailybusiness
review.com/id=1202620801693/New+Florida+Bar+Advertising+Rules+Vex+L
awyers%3Fmcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=ALL.
21

Dennis Kennedy & Allison C. Shields, LinkedIn: How to grow, nurture your
network
and
obtain
results,
YOURABA
(May
2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/youraba/201205article0
1.html.

22

Interview with Catalin Cosovanu, supra note 20.

23

Id.

24

Interview with Elizabeth Tarbert, Ethics Counsel, Florida Bar (Mar. 11, 2014)
[hereinafter Interview with Elizabeth Tarbert].

25

New Advertising Rules Adopted, THE FLA. BAR (Jan. 2013),
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/DDEE1897B
E68E11E85257B0A007B517D/$FILE/Summary%20of%20Changes%20to%20t
he%20Ad%20Rules.pdf?OpenElement.

26

Guidelines for Networking Sites, supra note 3.

27

Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation, FLA. BAR STANDING COMM.
ADVER. (Mar. 20, 2014), available at https://www.floridabar.org/TFB/
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Many firms believe that the Florida Rules concerning social media are some of
the most restrictive in the country,28 due to, among other things, the many
additional requirements they place on communication that might be
advertising.29
Even if LinkedIn appeared to reassure the Florida Bar, however, the
issue may not be completely resolved in other states.30 The nature of even the
new “Skills and Endorsements” section remains problematic.31
2.

Blogging or Posting About the Law

Does posting a newsletter or article on a site constitute advertising?
Intellectual property is one of the most vibrant and variable areas of the law.
Most practitioners would agree that blogging is a great way to join the legal
debate and gain credibility as an expert in the field, which would hopefully
attract future clients. But does this act, in and of itself, constitute advertising?
According to the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics, the answer is probably not.32 Blogs and other posts about the
law are considered to be mostly educational in purpose, even if they have an
indirect “rain‐making” function.33 State bar associations also agree that a

TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/3AC2BAA33CF257D885256B29004BDEE8/$F
ILE/Adv%20Handbook.pdf?OpenElement.
28

Kay, supra note 20.

29

See, e.g., David L. Hudson Jr., Firm Challenges Florida Bar Over Website Ad
Limits, ABA JOURNAL, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/firm_
challenges_florida_bar_over_website_ad_limits/ (Firm plaintiff attorney
states, “Florida easily has the most restrictive rules on attorney advertising
in the country.”) (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

30

For example, South Carolina, see infra Part II.B.

31

Id.

32

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 967, 2 (2013), available
at http://www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=28100.

33

See generally Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2010‐6, 7
(2010),
available
at
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/
PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion
%202010‐6.pdf. Blogging is acceptable under the Rules because the person
reading can decide on his/her own time if and when to respond.
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practitioner may answer legal questions posed by the public online,34 as occurs
on many websites and on the social media platform Avvo (although this practice
may implicate other ethical issues).35 In general, as long as the primary purpose
of posting information is not to encourage retaining the lawyer, this sort of
posting is permissible.36
3.

Posting About Professional Successes

Posting about professional successes is where the analysis gets nuanced.
Merely reporting facts, as long as they are not false or misleading, will likely not
implicate the advertising rules (although this practice may implicate
confidentiality issues—see infra Part III). Putting issues of client consent aside,
tweeting that a trial is over, or posting on a Facebook page that a deal
successfully closed or other sorts of publicly available information, is probably
acceptable under the Rules, provided that the information is verifiable and true.
But, if the announcement either requests future business or intimates that a
lawyer could deliver an equally successful result for a new client, the ethics rules
on advertising would apply.
As an example, the State Bar of California considered hypothetical
remarks by a practitioner on her social media profile page. It concluded that a
post stating: “Case finally over. Unanimous verdict! Celebrating tonight” was
not an advertisement. In contrast: “Won a million dollar verdict. Tell your
friends to check out my website,” was considered a “communication” for the
purpose of the state’s advertising and solicitation rules, as was the addition of

34

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 899, 2 (2011), available
at
http://old.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Ethics_Opinions&
template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=60961; N.C. State Bar Ethics
Op. 8, 2 (2011), available at http://www.ncbar.com/ethics/ethics.asp?
page=488.

35

The answers to the questions must remain general enough to avoid creating
an attorney‐client relationship, and therefore chance violations of
confidentiality obligations under MR 1.6; practitioners should also be wary
of being seen to be practicing law in another jurisdiction in violation of MR
5.5.

36

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 899.
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the last sentence in the following: “Another great victory in court today! My
client is delighted. Who wants to be next?”37
Under MR 7.2, a communication is an advertisement when it “involves
an active quest for clients.”38 As in the hypothetical statements from the
California Bar, sometimes posting about professional successes can constitute
advertising. What does that mean in practice? Once a communication becomes
an advertisement, not only must it comply with MR 7.1 such that it is truthful,
not misleading, and not likely to create unjustified expectations in the mind of a
client, but it also must comply with additional notice requirements of MR 7.2.39
For example, under Florida’s version of MR 7.2, advertisements must include the
name and location of the firm responsible for the content, so that recipients
would know where the attorney is located.40 This can be very challenging in the
context of social media.
Some Florida attorneys have complained about the new Florida rules,
wondering how to comply.41 Do they really have to list the information on every
post? Given the 140‐character limit, is it advisable or even possible to require
users of Twitter to include a name and office location in every tweet? The Florida
Bar Association’s suggestion is for a user to change his Twitter handle to include
his firm name, and use accepted abbreviations for his office location in the
tweet,42 thereby including the information in a space‐saving way. There is also a
location function in Twitter that, once enabled, broadcasts a location in a separate
line under the tweet, thereby preserving space in the message.43 But the Florida
Bar is clearly not modifying the notice requirement for social media posts, and
has not yet issued an advisory ethics opinion about whether using this space‐
saving function would comply with the requirement, which could be
problematic because the rule requires advertisements to show the location of the

37

Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2012‐186,
5 (2012), available at http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/portals/9/documents/opinions/
cal%202012‐186%20%2812‐21‐12%29.pdf.

38

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. 1 (2013).

39

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 (2013).

40

Kay, supra note 20.

41

Id.

42

Interview with Elizabeth Tarbert, supra note 24.

43

Adding
your
location
to
a
Tweet,
TWITTER,
available
https://support.twitter.com/articles/122236 (last visited Jan. 1, 2015).

at
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office, not the device that is sending the tweet. Until this is settled, lawyers that
live in a jurisdiction that imposes additional notice requirements on text
classified as advertising should determine a way to include the location of their
firm in their social media messages (and of course will need to keep their
messages brief to accommodate).
An important additional point is that a lawyer’s services need not cost
anything for a communication to be considered advertising. Even if a lawyer
offers a free consultation or even offers all services for free, according to at least
one state, upon signaling “availability for professional employment,” he is
advertising.44
4.

Specifically Soliciting Business

Similar to messages sent in the offline world through more traditional
means, advertising messages over social media sent beyond a lawyer’s circle of
“followers,” “friends,” and “connections” (and not to a current or former client
or family member) are subject to the rules concerning solicitations. MR 7.3 guides
the situation when a lawyer sends messages out to recipients that have not
specifically opted in to receive them.45
Public policy around the Rules protects the consumer from the
overreaching lawyer trying to solicit business when the consumer is ill equipped
to make an informed decision about whom to hire to represent her.46 Under the
Rules, communication that falls under the solicitation requirements must not
only comply with all the requirements of verifiability and veracity, but must also
be specifically labeled “Advertising Material” and must not be delivered as a
“real‐time” contact.47
“Real‐time” contact has traditionally meant face‐to‐face contact or
contact over a telephone, where a person may have difficulty resisting persuasive
techniques.48 Can electronic communications ever constitute “real‐time” contact?

44

Cal. State Bar Comm. Prof’l Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 2012‐186.

45

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013)

46

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 2 (2013).

47

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 (2013).

48

See, e.g., LEGAL ETHICS—THE LAWYER’S DESKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY § 7.3‐2 (Ronald D. Rotunda & John S. Dzienkowski ed., 2013–
2014) (“The drafters of the 2002 Rules added the reference to real‐time
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The answer is unclear. Many states specifically characterize chat rooms as “real‐
time” contact but have determined that e‐mail is not.49 States, however, do not
address whether other forms of electronic communication are similarly “real‐
time.”50 Is InMail on LinkedIn or a direct message on Twitter “real‐time”
communication? In both of these instances, a user can target someone outside of
her network specifically and in a direct way (similar to knocking on their
electronic door), but the recipient may not feel pressure to respond immediately
(if ever).
For those states that have adopted the 20/20 changes to the Model Rules,
MR 7.3 explains specifically that electronic formats do not constitute “real‐time
contact” for purposes of solicitation.51 Messages sent to potential clients are
acceptable as long as they meet the other requirements under the Rules.52 The
Philadelphia Bar has specifically attempted to clarify the issue: “[PA Model] Rule
7.3 does not bar the use of social media for solicitation purposes where the
prospective clients to whom the lawyer’s communication is directed have the
ability, readily exercisable, to simply ignore the lawyer’s overture, just like they
could a piece of directed, targeted mail.”53 But there are confusing outcomes. For
advertising purposes, Florida makes a distinction between the rules an attorney
need follow if he posts over a public Twitter account versus if his tweets only go
out to followers.54 Yet, if an attorney limits his posting to only followers, his
tweets are not viewable even by potential clients that seek him out. This
interpretation of the solicitation rules may be overreaching and counteract the
electronic contact because they believed that it was similar to live in‐person
or telephone contact.”).
49

See, e.g., Fla. Bar Standing Comm. Advertising, Advisory Op. A‐00‐1 (2010);
Ill. Bar Ass’n, Advisory Op.96‐10 (1997); Mich. Bar, Ethics Op. RI‐276 (1996);
Utah Bar Ethics Advisory Op. 97‐10 (1997).

50

See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.03 cmt. 1 (2010).

51

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 3 (2013) (“This potential for
abuse inherent in direct in‐person, live telephone or real‐time electronic
solicitation justifies its prohibition . . . communications can be mailed or
transmitted by email or other electronic means that do not involve real‐time
contact and do not violate other laws governing solicitations . . . without
subjecting the public to direct in‐person, telephone or real‐time electronic
persuasion that may overwhelm a person’s judgment.”).

52

Id.

53

Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2010‐6.

54

Guidelines for Networking Sites, supra note 3.
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public’s interest in being able to search for and find competent counsel. As
another example of a confusing result, some states have specifically stated that
electronic formats can constitute “real‐time contact,” but only if the message sent
in this manner seeks pecuniary gain.55
It is critical to check the applicable state’s rules and advisory opinions to
see where any specific state falls on the spectrum. Whether or not sending a
solicitation through a specific electronic format constitutes a “real‐time” contact
might depend on the intent of the sender, the method of delivery or sometimes
on a combination of the two.56
B.

When Others’ Posts About You May Violate Ethics Rules on
Advertising
1.

Third Parties Posting to Your Profile

Although the Rules regarding advertising may be confusing, at least
when a lawyer is doing her own posting, she can control what is said. Yet the
appeal of social media is that a conversation may grow organically among a
community of people, with or without any one person’s input. What happens
when one party posts a comment endorsing another party’s work, and that
comment is visible to potential clients? This happens specifically with the
Endorsements and Recommendations features in LinkedIn and the rating feature
in Avvo. What is a practitioner’s responsibility to check and verify her third
party endorsements, recommendations or ratings? Sites like Martindale Hubbell,
Avvo and superlawyers.com even create a profile without the subject’s
knowledge or consent, and populate it with data gathered from public sources or
through FOIA requests. Can these profiles, created without consent or even
knowledge, subject a lawyer to liability for violating advertising rules? The short
answer is yes.
The South Carolina Bar stated that users are responsible for all
information on their profiles, no matter what the source, from the moment that

55

N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt. 9 (2010).

56

Richard C. Klein, The Advent of Social Networking: Addressing the Model Rules
on Attorney Advertising and Solicitation, 5 BIOTECHNOLOGY & PHARMACEUTICAL
L. REV. 60, 78–80 (2012) (discussing an “intent‐based” approach,
“categorical” approach, and “hybrid” approach).
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they take control of the information.57 “By claiming a website listing, a lawyer
takes responsibility for its content and is then ethically required to conform the
listing to [the communication and advertising rules].”58 At least for now, if there
is a profile out there concerning a lawyer, once he “claims” it, he is responsible
for monitoring its use. For example, in Florida, if a lawyer becomes aware that a
third party has posted information about him on a site that the third party
controls, he must ask the third party to remove or change whatever is incorrect
or misleading in order to be excused from liability.59
What liability would ensue? As with anything that a lawyer posts
herself, information must not be false and misleading under MR 7.1.60 Lawyers
should clearly remove or hide any endorsements for skills outside their practice
areas or comments that are not true. But are even true endorsements a problem?
If a lawyer leaves endorsements on her profile, is she claiming a specialty or
indicating an expertise in violation of MR 7.4? Even as LinkedIn has changed the
obviously problematic labels, does the problem remain? Or are endorsements at
best similar to the Facebook “like”—ubiquitous and therefore almost
meaningless?
The South Carolina Bar gives guidance to its members to leave their
endorsements on their LinkedIn page only at their peril: “[A] lawyer who adopts
or endorses information on any [social media] web site becomes responsible for
conforming all information in the lawyer’s listing to the Rules of Professional
Conduct.”61 Luckily, LinkedIn has recently implemented other changes (in
response to feedback from lawyers as well as nonlawyers) that allow a user to
easily manage her Skills and Endorsements section by deleting any skill
completely and hiding (although not deleting) some or all of her endorsements.62
A user also has complete control over what skills get added to her profile.

57

S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 09‐10 (“[A]ll information contained
therein . . . [is] subject to the rules governing communication and advertising
once the lawyer claims the listing.”).

58

Id.

59

Guidelines for Networking Sites, supra note 3.

60

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 cmt. 1 (2013) (“Whatever means are
used to make known a lawyer’s services, statements about them must be
truthful.”).

61

S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 09‐10.

62

Interview with Catalin Cosovanu, supra note 20.
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Finally, it is possible to hide the content of this entire section in an abundance of
caution, especially if an attorney practices in a jurisdiction with strict rules
against holding oneself out as an expert or claiming a specialty.
Another potential issue is some states’ bans on testimonials.63 If, as
allowed on Avvo, a client posts a story about a great success and his attorney’s
wonderful work on his behalf, could that constitute a testimonial in violation of
the ethics rules? Similarly, some states allow testimonials, but mandate that
specific disclaimers or labels must be added to such posts.64 Finally, some states
may allow clients to post general “endorsements” of their attorneys in some
circumstances, but not testimonials.65 If a client’s extremely enthusiastic post
crosses the line from an endorsement to a testimonial as that is interpreted in a
particular state, must an attorney in that state ask the client to recast the
comment in more neutral language or over more general themes?
In summary, an attorney should expect that she will be held accountable
for all information posted on any site that she controls, even if the information
was placed there by third parties. She should also expect to be obligated to ask
third parties to remove any misleading or incorrect information she discovers,
even if she does not control the site. Addressing LinkedIn endorsements, at least
one state has counseled its members to “hide” all LinkedIn endorsements.66 To be
safe, if an attorney’s state does not allow testimonials generally, she should
monitor third party posts to her profile just as she would monitor what she uses
on her website or in written advertising material. In general she should be as
vigilant over what she says on her social media profile, no matter the source of
the post, as she is about what she says in person.
2.

Asking for Endorsements or Recommendations

Given the controversy surrounding the Skills and Endorsements section
of the LinkedIn profile, an attorney might conclude that it is not worth the risk to
allow third party recommendations at all on his profile. But it is clearly powerful

63

See, e.g., WYO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(d) (2012).

64

See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1‐400 (Standards).

65

S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 09‐10.

66

Id. (“A lawyer should not solicit, nor allow publication of, testimonials . . . If
any part of the listing cannot be conformed to the Rules (e.g., if an improper
comment cannot be removed), the lawyer should remove his or her entire
listing and discontinue participation in the service.”).
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and persuasive to have someone else vouching for your credibility. If, on
balance, an attorney decides that he would like to allow endorsements, there is
an additional question. Should he ask a colleague or a client to post something
supportive to his profile?
Assuming what an attorney posts meets all other ethical requirements of
advertising under the state rules (e.g., truthful, not misleading, not violating
confidentiality, posted with relevant disclaimers and labels if necessary, not sent
as an unsolicited real‐time communication, not implying a specialty and not
qualifying as a testimonial, etc.), and the attorney takes responsibility for the
material once it is posted, he can request such recommendations or
endorsements.67 But he must ensure not to offer any payment in return, whether
monetary or in kind (even a reciprocal recommendation). If he has compensated
the colleague or client for the courtesy, he has violated MR 7.2.68
III.

BEING MINDFUL OF BREACHING CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY

Most IP practitioners avoid breaching client confidentiality in the
physical world. They safeguard files, mark and control client communication,
and watch what they mention to whom. In a perfect world, it should be no
different online. Yet the online world, particularly the world of social media,
presents unique temptations and challenges. Because communication through
social media may be more personal and casual than in person, and because the
culture demands that an attorney post quickly or chance losing the attention of
his followers, it is easy to err and offer more information than may be technically
allowed under confidentiality obligations. In addition, because the
communication is widespread and instantaneous, the impact of a violation is
exponentially more severe than in the physical world.
To give one example, suppose a lawyer tweets procedural information
about his case from court, being careful to only include public information, as in:
“Patent trial is finally over! We won on summary judgment!” Could that possibly
violate the Rules? Unfortunately, yes. MR 1.6 states that “[a] lawyer shall not

67

Id.; Steven W. Kasten, Professional Ethics and Social Media, 55 BOSTON B.J. 40,
41 (2011); see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. 5 (2013)
(discussing the general impermissibility of paying others to recommend a
lawyer); Conn. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 2012‐03.

68

Kasten, supra note 67, at 41; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. 5
(2013); Conn. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Ethics Comm., Informal Op. 2012‐03 (as
applied to Connecticut’s Rule 7.2(c)).
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reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives
informed consent . . . .”69 In other words, simply because this is his client, the
lawyer is bound to preserve even public information about the case under MR
1.6.70 This is especially difficult to understand when the same information might
be tweeted, without any ethical violation whatsoever, by a reporter, a bystander,
or even another lawyer from a different firm attending the trial, but whom is not
part of the case. The lawyer must secure informed consent from his client before
he may tweet. 71
Informed consent is also a slippery concept. A law firm might include a
standard phrase in its form engagement letter that secures the client’s permission
for the firm to use the client’s name, logo, and information about the
representation in social media for promotional purposes. Does that consent
extend to all information? If the letter was signed two years ago, is the consent
still valid? Is there any limit on exactly what the firm can do with the identifying
information? Compare this engagement letter consent to the situation where the
informed consent is much more immediate and tailored, for example when an
attorney shows a draft blog posting to a client for approval, just moments before
it is uploaded. It is difficult to assert that the engagement letter method grants
completely informed consent.72
An additional scenario presents itself when a client posts a negative
review of his lawyer’s services on social media. Can the lawyer reveal client
confidential information in order to defend himself from a bad review? MR
1.6(b)(5) says that it is acceptable to reveal confidential information “to respond
to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer’s representation of the
client.”73 But in one very public case that played out on Avvo, a client posted a
derogatory review of his counsel where he accused her of taking a fee to

69

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2013).

70

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2013) (“The confidentiality
rule, for example, applies not only to matters communicated in confidence
by the client but also to all information relating to the representation,
whatever its source. A lawyer may not disclose such information except as
authorized or required by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.”).

71

See id.

72

Helen W. Gunnarsson, Friending Your Enemies, Tweeting Your Trials: Using
Social Media Ethically, 99 ILL. B.J. 500, 501–02 (2011).

73

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(5) (2013).
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represent him when she knew he could not recoup a monetary award.74 The
attorney responded that the client had made the case impossible to win because
of his “own actions in beating up a female coworker.”75 Although the case settled
before judgment, the attorney had to agree to a reprimand from the State Bar.76
Was that the right result given Rule 1.6(b)(5)? Possibly so, because there
was no “proceeding,” even though the attorney must have felt harmed by the
public accusation. In addition, perhaps the Rules require lawyers to hold
themselves to a higher standard. As one commentator to the ABA article on the
incident pointed out:
Our recourse is the same as every other profession…Soldier on!!
Would it be ethical for a doctor to disclose a medical condition,
or your account[ant] to publicize your Grand Cayman accounts
because you posted a bad review? Of course not… If a posting
rises to the level of slander or extortion[,] take legal action.
Otherwise, rely on you [sic] good work and reputation to carry
you through. 77
What can a practitioner do to share information related to his case that
would be of interest to his followers, friends, and contacts? He could get
informed consent from his client to reveal the specific information. He could also
report on others’ cases, for which he has no Rule 1.6 duty. He could also
comment on the underlying legal theories that his case challenges or represents.
As long as he is careful about revealing actual facts, there is much information a
practitioner may tweet.78

74

Joint Stipulation, Betty Tsamis (2014) (Comm’n. No. 2013PR00095), available
at http://www.iardc.org/HB_RB_Disp_Html.asp?id=11221.

75

Complaint, Betty Tsamis (2014) (Comm’n. No. 2013PR00095), available at
http://www.iardc.org/13PR0095CM.html.

76

Joint Stipulation, supra note 74.

77

Frsnojake, Comment to Lawyer’s response to client’s bad Avvo review leads to
disciplinary complaint, A.B.A. J. ONLINE (Sept. 13, 2013, 3:00 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/lawyers_alleged_response_to_bad_
avvo_review_leads_to_disciplinary_complaint/?utm_medium=email&utm_c
ampaign=weekly_email&utm_source=maestro&sc_cid=130911AE.
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Gunnarsson, supra note 72, at 502–03.
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In summary, the quick, short bursts of information that mark
communication through most social media is an anathema to the thoughtful,
measured thinking that usually bolsters efforts to keep client information
confidential. The desire to be timely, relevant, and interesting worsens a situation
ripe for an ethical slip. Just as the likelihood of a violation increases, the
consequences of disclosure also escalate with the possibility of widespread
instant dissemination. Before pressing <send,> practitioners have to consider
whether the client has given specific approval for that message to go out to the
world.
IV.

USING SOCIAL MEDIA FOR DISCOVERY

Social media can be a potent discovery tool. Just as e‐discovery changed
what documents lawyers requested, and how lawyers saved information, some
academics postulate that social media will bring about an equally exponential
shift in discovery policy and practice.79
A.

Accessing Public Profiles and Feeds

Some bar associations have considered the issue of accessing public
profiles.80 They unanimously agree that this practice is in compliance with the
ethical rules.81 As is the case with any other public record, this information is
neither privileged nor private.82 State court opinions have even quoted
Facebook’s own terms of use as justification, which (at the time of the opinion)
stated that users should “keep in mind that if you disclose personal information
in your profile or when posting comments, messages, photos, videos,

79

See John G. Browning, Keep Your “Friends” Close and Your Enemies Closer:
Walking the Ethical Tightrope in the Use of Social Media, 3 ST. MARYS J. LEGAL
MALPRACTICE AND ETHICS 204, 207 (2013); see generally Sandra Hornberger,
Social Networking Websites: Impact on Litigation and the Legal Profession in
Ethics, Discovery, and Evidence, 27 TOURO L. REV. 279 (2011).

80

See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 843 (2010);
Oregon State Bar Association, Formal Op. 2013‐189 (2013).

81

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 843; Oregon State Bar
Association, Formal Op. 2013‐189.

82

N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 843; Oregon State Bar
Association, Formal Op. 2013‐189.
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Marketplace listing or other items, this information may become publicly
available.”83
B.

Accessing Private Profiles and Feeds

A more interesting question is whether an attorney can access social
media accounts that are protected as private. What Rules might be implicated,
and what do the courts and state bars associations say? This is usually discussed
in the context of Facebook, where the attorney would have to be affirmatively
accepted as a “Friend” by the user in order to gain access. This could also be the
case with LinkedIn, where the user would have to “Accept [the attorney’s]
Invitation” to become connected, or Twitter, if the user has reset the general
settings such that the attorney could not “Follow his Feed” until the user accepts
him as a “Follower.”
1.

The Opposing Party’s Site

Because the opposing party is represented, Rule 4.2 mandates that all
contact go through counsel.84 Therefore, sending a friend request, a request to
follow, or an invitation to connect is not allowed.85 Access to the contents of a
private site needs to come from other means. For example, an attorney can
officially request access to private sites through discovery requests, usernames
and passwords through interrogatories, specific information though depositions,
and printouts of the history of the posts through document requests.86 The
attorney can also specifically ask for the party’s consent to access all social media
sites and compel the discovery if there is resistance.87
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Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 30 Misc. 3d 426, 434 (2010) (quoting Facebook
Principles, FACEBOOK (Nov. 26, 2008), https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms).

84

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2013).

85

See San Diego Cnty. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2 (2011)

86

Facebook has specifically rolled out an application that allows a user to
download his entire posting history. How can I download my information from
Facebook?,
FACEBOOK,
available
at
https://www.facebook.com/help/
212802592074644 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
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Sharon R. Klein et al., Ethical Issues that Arise from Social Media Use in
HAMILTON
(Oct.
14,
2013),
available
at
Courtrooms,
PEPPER
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2769.
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This is a far more effective technique than to rely on a third party
subpoena to get the information from the social media sites themselves.88
Generally, the third party sites will not respond to a subpoena unless the
requesting attorney has the user’s consent to access the information, or he has
secured a court order (which is unlikely unless he also has secured the user’s
consent).89 Facebook’s terms of use state it this way: “We may access, preserve
and share your information in response to a legal request (like a search warrant,
court order or subpoena) if we have a good faith belief that the law requires us to
do so.”90
2.

Sites of Other Parties

But an attorney might also get valuable information by gaining access to
the private sites of witnesses, friends of the opposing party, or other interested
people that are not represented by counsel. Other than issuing a subpoena, is the
attorney operating within the Rules to attempt to access those sites through a
friend request hoping that the target responds favorably? What Rules guide this
behavior, and how do the courts and state bar associations respond?
Generally lawyers may request to connect to the privately‐held
information of unrepresented parties, so long as they do not engage in deceptive
practices.91 What constitutes a deceptive practice in violation of the Rules,
however, depends on the facts, and to some extent on the jurisdiction. For
example, in an advisory fact pattern presented to both the Philadelphia Bar
Association Professional Guidance Committee and the San Diego County Bar
Association, the lawyer wanted to send a friend request to a relevant party, using
truthful information, but without revealing his purpose in doing so. Both bar
associations deemed the behavior deceptive, in violation of the ethical rules.92

88

Joel P. Schroeder & Leita Walker, Social Media in Civil Litigation, FAEGER
BAKER DANIELS (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://www.faegrebd.com/12201.

89

Id.

90

Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/full_data_use_policy
(last visited Jan. 2, 2015).

91

See San Diego Cnty. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2; Phila. Bar Ass’n
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2009‐2; Ass’n of the Bar of the City of
New York Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2010‐2.

92

San Diego Cnty. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Formal Op. 2; Phila. Bar Ass’n
Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2009‐2. In the case of San Diego, the
behavior violated California’s Business and Professionals Code section
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The Philadelphia Bar also claimed that such conduct would constitute
professional misconduct under Rule 8.4(c), which cautions lawyers not to
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”93
The Philadelphia Bar also addressed whether the lawyer could instead
ask an agent to “friend” the target, using only truthful statements, but still
concealing the purpose of the “friend request.” The Bar concluded that such an
action would violate both Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct to “(a) violate
or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or
induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another”) and Rule 5.3(c)(1)
(“a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct if engaged in by a lawyer if….(1)
the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved . . . .”).94
Neither Bar considered whether the conduct would also violate Rule 4.3,
which demands candor from an attorney when dealing with an unrepresented
person. That Rule specifically states:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not
represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the
lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably
should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the
lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable
efforts to correct the misunderstanding.95
Arguably, the lawyer might be bound to disclose his role in the trial or deal, and
why he is asking for access to the party’s social media information.
In contrast, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
Committee on Professional Ethics issued an opinion in which the Bar specifically

6068(d) and a common law duty, and in the case of Philadelphia, the
behavior was in violation of Pennsylvania’s equivalent of Rule 4.1, which
prohibits “mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person.” Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2009‐2.
93

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2013).

94

Phila. Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Formal Op. 2009‐2; MODEL RULES
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3(c)(1), 8.4(a) (2013).

95

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2013).
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allowed an attorney to issue a friend request without revealing his purpose.96 So
long as the friend request itself used the sender’s real name and thus was not
inherently deceptive, the attorney or agent did not have to tell the recipient what
purpose he had in seeking the invitation.97 The New York City Bar opinion
distinguished this behavior from unethical behavior, such as creating a false
Facebook profile in order to dupe the recipient into accepting the friend request
under false pretenses.98
The Oregon State Bar came to a similar conclusion as the New York City
Bar, stating that lawyer or his agent could send a friend request, not revealing
the purpose of the request, so long as the lawyer’s behavior comported with
Oregon’s version of Rule 4.3.99 It was up to the recipient to decide whether or not
to accept the request, and the lawyer needed only clarify his purpose if the
unrepresented person was operating under a misunderstanding as to the
lawyer’s role.
This practice of informal discovery could be analogized to a long‐
approved information‐gathering method quite familiar to IP practitioners—the
practice of using agents to buy products from a competitor under assumed
names and circumstances in order to establish infringement. Social media could
likewise be used elsewhere in an intellectual property practice to provide
valuable evidence, for example, by sending out a tweet or Facebook message to a
group to test for actual confusion, gaining access to a private YouTube account to
check for misuse of copyrighted material, or checking on Twitter for hashtag use
of either a client’s or an accuser’s trademark. Determining whether these
96

Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2010‐2 (2010).

97

Id. at 2 (“Consistent with the policy [of informal discovery], we conclude
that an attorney or her agent may use her real name and profile to send a
‘friend request’ to obtain information from an unrepresented person’s social
networking website without also disclosing the reasons for making the
request.”).

98

Id. at 2–3.

99

Oregon State Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2013‐189 at 579–80 (“Lawyer may
request access to non‐public information if the person is not represented by
counsel in that matter and no actual representation of disinterest is made by
Lawyer . . . . A simple request to access nonpublic information does not
imply that Lawyer is ‘disinterested’ in the pending legal matter. On the
contrary, it suggests that Lawyer is interested in the person’s social
networking information, although for an unidentified purpose.”).
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discovery methods are advisable under the Rules involves a similarly nuanced
analysis, which might turn on the jurisdiction.
In summary, whether or not such practices might constitute violations of
the Rules seems to turn on the facts, and where the local bar association stands
on consumer protection. Some associations seem to take a more paternalistic
approach to the “caveat emptor” philosophy. Although all bar associations
would likely agree that an attorney that creates a fake Facebook profile in order
to fool a party into granting access to private information violates the Rules,
some bar associations are also willing to impute an additional duty onto the
attorney to offer unsuspecting consumers an additional warning. Lawyers who
practice in one of these jurisdictions should proceed with care.
V.

SOME ISSUES INVOLVED WITH USING SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE LITIGATION
CONTEXT

Besides the confidentiality limitations on counsel reporting progress
from court, bar associations have commented on other uses of social media in
court. Specifically the discussion centers on (1) accessing jurors’ social media
accounts, either to research them or to ensure they are not communicating
inappropriately during a trial; and (2) judges’ use of social media.
A.

Checking Up on Jurors
1.

During Voir Dire

Social media provides a great opportunity for an attorney to learn more
about potential jurors. Not only can an attorney get a broader picture of the
person they are considering in voir dire, but also they can double‐check the
veracity of the potential juror’s responses. Is it an ethical violation to investigate
potential jurors in this way? Unlike when an attorney checks public accounts of
witnesses or other unrepresented parties, at least one judge has stated that it is
against public policy to research jurors, even using publicly‐available
information, because “There’s a real potential for a chilling effect on jury service,
by jurors, to know ‘I’m going to go out to the courthouse. [. . . ]I’m going to be
Googled. They’re going to find all kinds of stuff on me[]’ . . . .”100 Most other
courts are less concerned about using publicly‐available information, although

100

St. John Barned‐Smith, Montgomery judge denies Internet searches for jury
selection, GAZETTE (May 15, 2013), available at http://www.gazette.net/article/
20130515/NEWS/130519448/1123/montgomery‐judge‐denies‐internet‐
searches‐for‐jury‐selection&template=gazette.
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even in those instances (1) the juror must not be able to know about the research,,
and (2) if counsel uncovers an inconsistency between what a juror stated in voir
dire and what is on his social media site, counsel must report the inconsistency to
the court.101
As a practical matter, it is easy for an attorney to hide his presence on
Facebook and Twitter because an account holder does not see visitors to his
public feed.102 LinkedIn, however, has a function where it monitors and reports
the names and titles of any visitors to a profile.103 If an attorney intends to
research a juror, he should ensure his privacy settings on the platform are set to
hide his presence.
In addition, on the exact opposite end of the spectrum, at least one court
has attributed an affirmative duty that attorneys check publicly available
information on prospective jurors, at least in order to check to see if they
answered truthfully about whether they have ever served on another jury.104 But,
this case was limited to the one database, and did not state that the duty
extended to other sources of public information.105
Could counsel take the next step to access a prospective juror’s private
feed by sending a friend request or subscribing to her Twitter accounts?
Consistent with what might be expected, the answer, even in relatively social
media user‐friendly New York City, is no. Because most courts insist that
counsel’s attempts to view even public pages of potential jurors remain stealthy,
it is not surprising that courts would discourage affirmative attempts to
communicate with a potential juror, even if the attempt involved no deception.106

101

See N.Y. Cnty. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 743 (2011) (citing N.Y.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(d)); Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.
Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2012‐2 (2012); Oregon State
Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 2013‐189 (2012).

102

Common Myths About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/
369078253152594/ (“No, Facebook doesn’t let people track who views their
profile. Third‐party apps also can’t provide this functionality.”).
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Who’s Viewed Your Profile—Frequently Asked Questions,
https://help.linkedin.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/42/ft/eng.
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See Johnson v. McCullough, 306 S.W.3d 551, 558–59 (2010) (en banc).
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Id. (limiting searches of venire members’ past litigation history to Case.net).
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Model Rule 3.5 is also consistent with this holding in spirit, because under
that Rule a lawyer may not “(a) seek to influence a . . . prospective juror . . .
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As the Committee on Professional Ethics of the Bar of the City of New York
Opinion summarized:
[I]t is proper and ethical under [NY] Rule 3.5 for a lawyer to
undertake a pretrial search of a prospective juror’s social
networking site, provided that there is no contact or communication
with the prospective juror and the lawyer does not seek to ‘friend’
jurors, subscribe to their Twitter accounts, send jurors tweets or
otherwise contact them.107
In summary, although some courts have worried about possible public
policy implications of allowing attorneys to investigate prospective jurors using
publicly available information on social media, most courts allow—or even
encourage—such investigation. So long as the attorneys investigate without
contacting the juror (including through passive means, as occurs when a social
media platform reveals who has “visited” a profile), and attorneys reveal to the
court any information that undermines what a prospective juror has stated
during voir dire, such investigation comports with the Rules.
2.

During and After the Case

Jurors are instructed and bound by the judge not to talk about the case
during their jury service lest they spoil the sanctity of a fair trial. Yet courts
report that they cannot easily check jurors’ social media use.108 As a result, most
courts allow attorneys to check on jurors and report any violations.109 This right
clearly extends to public pages and could conceivably extend to private pages, so
long as the lawyer proceeds only with the judge’s authorization so as not to
violate Rule 3.5(b).110 Just as during voir dire, courts state that a lawyer is under
an obligation to report any instance of juror communication that contravenes a
court order.111

by means prohibited by law” or “(b) communicate ex parte with such a
person during the proceeding unless authorized to do so by law or court
order.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (2013).
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Ass’n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op.
2012‐2 (emphasis added).
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Klein et al., supra note 87.
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5(b) (2013).
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Klein et al., supra note 87.
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Once the jury has been discharged, can a lawyer “friend” a juror? There
is much less written about this scenario, but just as with any other instance of
communication, a lawyer may likely contact a juror through social media after
the case is over.112 Other than the usual limitations imposed by Rule 4.3 guiding
contact with an unrepresented person, the lawyer should only be limited if: “(1)
the communication is prohibited by law or court order; (2) the juror has made
known to the lawyer a desire not to communicate; or (3) the communication
involves misrepresentation, coercion, duress or harassment.”113
B.

Being “Friends” with a Judge

Judges are not immune to the lure of social media use or the scrutiny
surrounding such use. Just as it is an effective business tool for attorneys, elected
judges especially might use social media as a component of their public
campaigns. In addition, several states114 and the ABA itself115 have recognized a
public interest in having judges connected to the communities they serve. But
judges’ impartiality is so paramount to the administration of a fair trial that even
the appearance of impropriety violates the Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the
“Code”), the judicial analogy to the Rules.116 Of the fair amount of discussion
about judges’ use of social media, this article focuses on one sub issue, chosen
because it also impacts practitioners’ ethical use of social media: should judges
be allowed to connect to/friend/follow or be followed by the attorneys that
advocate before them without violating rules protecting the impartiality of the
court?117
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 cmt. 3 (2013).
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MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.5 (c) (2013).
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See, e.g., California Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Committee, Op. 66, 4 (2010);
Ethics Comm. of the Kentucky Judiciary, Formal Judicial Ethics Op. JE‐119, 5
(2010); South Carolina Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct,
Op. 17‐2009.
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ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, 2 (2013)

116

Canon 1 of the ABA Model Rules of Judicial Conduct states that “[a] judge
shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity and impartiality of
the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011).
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Most of the cases concern Facebook, so I will discuss “friending.” Many of
the cases are stated in broad terms, however, so the opinions could apply to
other forms of social media.
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There are a number of thoughtful opinions on the subject from the state
supreme court committees on judicial ethics and also the ABA itself.118 But they
offer widely varying advice. Judges should of course otherwise comply with the
canons of the Code as adopted by the state when posting updates or
comments.119 The specific questions, however, of whether and when judges can
connect through social media with which attorneys and how the judge should
handle such a connection, once the attorney appears before her in court, are not
settled.
The state committees with the most lenient view see “friending” as
nothing more than one more social interaction in the world.120 They allow judges
to establish a social media connection to attorneys without restriction. But the
committees then put the onus on judges to consider the depth and quality of the
particular relationship should the attorney come before the judge in court.121
Judges could decide to take no action, to reveal the relationship to opposing
counsel, or to even recuse themselves, but their choice would be fact specific. The
ABA opinion,122 and the states bar associations of New York123, Kentucky124,
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See Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009‐20; Md. Judicial Ethics
Comm., Published Op. 2012‐07.
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Among other things, the states are concerned about, ex parte
communication, undignified material or language, factual discovery about
the parties, legal advice, and commenting about an ongoing case, all
prohibited under the Code.
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Thomas G. Wilkinson, Jr., Judges and Social Media, COZEN 2–3 (Oct. 2013),
http://www.cozen.com/Templates/media/files/LEGAL%2016871329v1%20Ju
dges%20and%20Social%20Media%20‐%20PBA%20Civil%20Lit%20
Newsletter%20(7)%20%20%20%20.pdf.

121

Id.
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ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, 2–3 (2013)
(“A judge who has an ESM [electronic social media] connection with a
lawyer or party who has a pending or impending matter before the court
must evaluate the ESM connection to determine whether the judge should
disclose the relationship prior to, or at the initial appearance of that person
before the court. In this regard, context is significant . . . . The judge must
conduct the same analysis that must be made whenever matters before the
court involve persons the judge knows or has a connection with professional
or personally.”).
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N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08‐176, 1 (2009) (“A judge
must, therefore, consider whether any such online connections, alone or in
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Maryland125, and Ohio126 are in this category. These cases are mostly concerned
with actual bias or prejudice and the erosion of public confidence in an
independent judiciary.127
As a middle ground, California’s is also a fact‐based, contextual analysis
that focuses on actual bias, yet comes to a different result. California specifically
disallows “friending” of attorneys appearing before the judge, but allows
“friending” otherwise.128 Perhaps because the social media phenomenon was
born from Silicon Valley, the California Committee understands that “friending”
does not necessarily connote a strong relationship calling for a recusal, but it still
advises judges to consider the facts surrounding their use of the social media to

combination with other facts, rise to the level of a ‘close social relationship’
requiring disclosure and/or recusal.”).
124

Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Op. JE‐119, 3 (2010) (“The consensus of
this Committee is that participation and listing alone do not violate the
Kentucky Code of Judicial Conduct, and specifically do not ‘convey or
permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.’ Canon 2D. However, and like the New York committee,
this Committee believes that judges should be mindful of ‘whether on‐line
connections alone or in combination with other facts rise to the level of ‘a
close social relationship’ which should be disclosed and/or require
recusal.”).

125

Md. Judicial Ethics Comm., Published Op. 2012‐07 (2012) (“[I]t is the
Committee’s position that ‘the mere fact of a social connection’ does not
create a conflict. As the California Judicial Ethics Committee aptly observed,
‘[i]t is the nature of the [social] interaction that should govern the analysis,
not the medium in which it takes place.’”).
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Supreme Court of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Disputes, Op.
2010‐07, 1 (2010) (“A judge may be a ‘friend’ on a social networking site with
a lawyer who appears as counsel in a case before the judge . . . [But] to
comply with Jud. Cond. Rule 2.11(A)(1), a judge should disqualify himself or
herself from a proceeding when the judge’s social networking relationship
with a lawyer creates bias or prejudice concerning the lawyer for a party.
There is no bright‐line rule: not all social relationships, online or otherwise,
require a judge’s disqualification.”).
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analyze to what extent there could be a real or perceived bias.129 Looking at, for
example, how many “friends” the judge has, whether she always accepts friend
requests, how often the particular attorney might come before the judge, and
how personal the judge’s page is (the more personal, the higher the potential
bias) would help a judge analyze bias.130 When a lawyer is appearing before the
judge, however, California advises that a judge must “unfriend” or block
communication with the lawyer to avoid the ethical violation of ex parte
communication.131
Most of the remaining state committees categorically disapprove of
judges “friending” any attorneys that may have a chance of appearing before
them. These decisions are distinct in that they emphasize not only actual
impropriety and bias, but also whether there is simply the appearance of
impropriety. For example, the Massachusetts Committee on Judicial Ethics
claims “judges may only ‘friend’ attorneys as to whom they would recuse
themselves when those attorneys appeared before them.”132 The Oklahoma
Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel also advises a flat‐out bar on allowing judges to
“friend” attorneys that may appear before the court (and vice versa) based on no
more than appearances of impropriety.133
Florida has taken up this issue on four distinct occasions, even escalating
it to the state supreme court (although the Court refused to hear it). In each case,
the Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee refused to allow judges to “friend”
attorneys that might appear before them because it would violate Canon 2(b) of
the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct, which states in relevant part that, “[a]
judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests

129

Id. at 7–9.

130

Id.
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Id. at 10–11.
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Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 2011‐06, 1 (2011).
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Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, No. 2011‐3, ¶¶ 8–9 (2011) (“[W]hether
such posting would mean that the party was actually in a special position is
immaterial as it would or could convey that impression . . . We believe that
public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is so
important that is imperative to err on the side of caution where the situation
is ‘fraught with peril.’”).
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of the judge or others; nor shall a judge convey or permit others to convey the
impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.”134
The appearance of impropriety is enough. In the first case, the Florida
JEAC stated:
The issue, however, is not whether the lawyer actually is in a
position to influence the judge, but instead whether the
proposed conduct, the identification of the lawyer as a ‘friend’
on the social networking site, conveys the impression that the
lawyer is in a position to influence the judge. The Committee
concludes that such identification in a public forum of a lawyer
who may appear before the judge does convey this impression
and therefore is not permitted.135
Two years later, the Committee again considered Facebook “friending,” when a
judge asked if she could get around the ban with a proper disclaimer to all her
friends that would assure them that “friending” did not mean anything more
than they were acquaintances.136 The court again refused, stating:
[T]he Committee does not believe that such a disclaimer, as
perceived by members of the public, would dispel the message
which is conveyed by the presence of lawyers as “friends” on the
judge’s Facebook page. The Committee rejects any contention
that a judge can engage in unethical conduct so long as the judge
announces at the time that the judge perceives the conduct to be
ethical.137
Next, the court considered connecting on LinkedIn, because that platform is used
generally for more professional use.138 The Florida JEAC still refused: “The
Committee does not believe that there is meaningful distinction in this regard
between Facebook, and LinkedIn, a site used for professional networking,
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FLA. SUPREME COURT CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2 (2008), available at
http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/decisions/ethics/canon2.shtml.
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137

Id.

138

Fla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2012‐12.

186

AIPLA Q.J.

Vol. 43:1

because the selection and communication process is the same on both sites.”139
Finally, the Florida JEAC considered Twitter.140 It advised the judge not to be on
a list of followers, nor to “favorite” any tweets. But the one concession the
Florida JEAC made was that a judge could have a Twitter campaign account
handled by a manager.141
The considerable split between the state opinions may indicate a varied
understanding about what it means to connect with someone over social media.
The New York, Kentucky, Maryland, and Ohio committees’ willingness to
consider the content of the communication rather than focusing on the friending
itself may indicate a growing comfort with social media and a more relaxed
understanding of what “friendship” means on these sorts of platforms. The
Massachusetts, Oklahoma, and Florida committees’ worry was about
appearances.142 Yet if social mores are changing such that fewer people impute a
relationship solely from a connection through social media, we may be moving
to a world where such interaction is not as clearly as suspect. But until there is
consensus, at least one commentator recommends that judges and attorneys in
jurisdictions that have not considered this issue look to the ABA Judicial Ethics
Opinion, which is the only opinion that is national in scope.143
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Id. (“In sum, the inquiring judge will not be in violation of Canon 2B if a
Twitter account is created in that judge’s name. The most sensible way to
use Twitter as a campaign tool would be for the judge’s campaign
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irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must avoid all
impropriety and appearance of impropriety”).
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John G. Browning, Why Can’t We Be Friends? Judges’ Use of Social Media, 68 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 487, 510–11 (2014) (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 462, 4 (2013)) (“When used with proper care,
judges’ use of ESM does not necessarily compromise their duties under the
Model Code any more than use of traditional and less public forms of social
connection such as U.S. Mail, telephone, email or texting.”).
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CONCLUSION

Commentators like to use the term “Wild West,” to describe what is
happening as courts apply ethics rules in the social media context.144 But others
point out that we are simply applying old conversations to new technology.145 As
with other disruptive technologies, as social media in a legal practice becomes
more of a norm, practitioners will be better able to predict how to use the
technology to best accomplish business and professional goals while still
operating within the bounds of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Law firms can control their risk best by following a few suggestions.
They should set and enforce guidelines for all employees about posting
information onto individual sites and require that only designated individuals
post on behalf of the firm. Firms should designate a point person to manage all
firm social media so all posts originate from one place with one approved voice.
The same point person should review all professional LinkedIn and Facebook
profiles created by its employees to make sure the profiles comply with the
Rules, as well as offer training in how and what to post going forward. Finally,
the firm should monitor firm mentions and quash violations, even if that means
hiring an outside media monitor.
Individual attorneys should invest time, getting training if necessary, to
understand how various social media platforms work. IP lawyers are generally a
tech‐interested group, but still should make it a point to know more about social
media to benefit both their clients and themselves. IP lawyers need to be able to
search and manipulate social media tools in order to provide good counsel.
Professionally, IP lawyers should also know enough about social media to
exploit the many advantages of these platforms, and also understand what
information is available to whom to better navigate the ethics rules. As the
changes to LinkedIn show, these platforms are also ever evolving, so re‐
education every few months is necessary.
Just as it is important for lawyers to understand the functionality of
social media, it is critical for lawyers to keep up to date on the ethics opinions
and rulings regarding social media in their specific jurisdictions. Hopefully, the
interplay between social media and the ethics rules will settle into a general
consensus as ever increasing numbers of lawyers use social media in their daily
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practice. But, until that time, ongoing vigilance will help lawyers keep abreast of
developments and use social media with confidence.

